"Real Democracy in Palestine"

This article, first written in in September, 2000 and revised significantly with new content added by Georgetown University Professor Dan Brumberg in May, 2002, revives a thesis first advanced on this website in September 2001 (in an article entitled, "The secret to a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace"), namely, that only real Palestinian democracy, with its attendant emphasis on consultation, inclusion, freedom of speech and association and government accountability, will allow a peace deal to be negotiated that will stand the test of opinion on the "Arab street". While some of the references in this article are dated by the quickly changing conditions on the ground in Israel and Palestine, the central thesis holds true now more than ever. The international community and particularly the U.S., will not find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict through byzantine political maneuvers involving Arab states like Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but rather through understanding and supporting the indigenous democratic and pragmatic forces that exist in both Israel and Palestine. Only when the population in the West Bank and Gaza feel that their legitimate aspirations are being articulated through representative and accountable institutions will a lasting peace be possible.

Real Democracy in Palestine

By Daniel Brumberg and Leslie Campbell (May 19,2002)

Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat has promised democratic reform of the Palestinian Authority, but how should Palestinian democracy be defined? Moreover, once the content of political reforms is specified and even more so, implemented, will the prospects for Palestinian-Israeli peace be better or worse?

Democratic reforms cannot be merely administrative. Nor can they focus exclusively on corralling the many security forces that have paralyzed Palestinian politics. Instead, they must revive the civic, social and professional organizations that constitute the building blocs of Palestinian civil society; resuscitate existing democratic institutions such as the Palestinian Legislative Council; and if feasible, provide for competitive elections that give a parliamentary majority the means to exercise real authority.

Why pursue such far reaching political reforms when it appears that the most pressing challenge now facing the Palestinians is to rebuild the social, economic, educational and security infrastructure of everyday life? The dismal record of the Palestinian Authority demonstrates that state building, absent institutions to ensure accountability, is merely an avenue for corruption. Moreover, without effective representative bodies, some within the Palestinian Authority may remain tempted to use the language of incitement and hatred to distract attention from their own failure to secure democracy.

The roots of this failure go back to the first Palestinian elections in January 1996. Hamas. decision to boycott the elections, and the splitting of the vote among non-Fatah independents conspired to give Fatah 70 percent of the seats in the new Palestinian Legislative Council with 30 percent of the vote. While Arafat's uncontested prestige assured his election as president, there was no constitutional means to ensure that his majority exercised authority democratically. Unaccountable from day one, Arafat and a small group of insiders from the PLO's Tunis days embarked on a program to undermine the very civil society institutions that could have constituted a viable political center. Predictably, their success in this only benefited Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

The international community unintentionally blessed this arrangement in the belief that pursuing a two-state solution should take precedence over democratization. But the longer it took to secure a peace settlement, the more likely it became that a new generation of Palestinian leaders would revolt against both Israel and Arafat. Facing mounting discontent, Arafat hesitated at Camp David to accept an Israeli offer that, however unprecedented, created in the eyes of most Palestinians a patchwork of Bantustans rather than a viable state. By the time President Clinton presented Barak and Arafat a much more ambitious plan at Taba, the Al-Aksa Intifada was raging. Lacking a democratic mechanism to mobilize the street behind his leadership, Arafat chose to ignore or encourage terrorism in the hope that it would strengthen his hand with his own rivals and with Israel.

Since Arafat"s liberation from Israeli confinement, there has been an international chorus insisting that he adopt reforms. Anticipating such calls, the Palestinian Authority responded on Friday, May 3, by holding a leadership meeting, after which it declared the PA would undertake comprehensive and radical internal reforms. Now Arafat himself has, rhetorically at least, come out in favor of improving Palestinian political institutions. Realistically, though, Arafat's promises won't make an iota of difference unless there is concerted international pressure on the PA to adopt measures that inject democratic legitimacy into Palestinian governance.

To begin with, the PA must allow the various civic institutions that have thus far been stifled to reemerge and coalesce around a viable party. Reconstituting the political center will also make it easier to contain radical Islamists. After all, when the playing field is reduced to a Fatah-Islamist duel, Fatah's option is either to repress Islamists and/or to mimic their rhetoric and actions. Lost in this dangerous stand-off are the moderatesprofessionals, academics, students, shopkeepers who if given a real chance to participate, would play a central role in a new coalition for peace. The challenge is not to exclude the Islamists, but to force them to compete in a genuinely competitive political arena.

A full and legitimate renewal of politics in Palestine must also include a new constitution that provides for the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and for clearly defined executive and legislative powers that enable a prime minister to govern with a majority. A constitution embodying many of these principles exists in draft form but has been repeatedly ignored by Arafat. The time has arrived to finalize its articles and establish it as the political foundation of a Palestinian state.

With a constitution in place, a final step would be the holding of new elections. Such a poll was in fact provided for in 1994 Oslo Accords, which stipulated that the PA's mandate should end in May 1999. While elections are only one part of a overall reform program, their role would not only be to strengthen the legitimacy of the PA, but also to ensure that any peace agreement it signs has the clear support of the Palestinian people in Gaza and the West Bank.

Ultimately, such an agreement will be carefully scrutinized and loudly debated in every forum. In Israel, all voices will be heard and accounted for, extreme opinions moderated, and any agreement finally adopted will likely stand the test of time. No such process exists within the Palestinian territories. Absent the crucible of democracy, another shaky peace deal could be blown apart by virtually any provocateur. It may be true that a Palestinian state cannot emerge without Yasser Arafat, but the creation of a democratic Palestinian state should allow an Israeli prime minister, even Sharon, to sign a treaty. After all, while Arafat will not be around indefinitely, we can hope that democratic Palestine will live in peace with a democratic Israel forever.

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