The Road To Palestinian Elections

Les Campbell, National Democratic Institute

While the continuing conflict and deteriorating conditions in the West Bank and Gaza can make discussions of Palestinian elections and democracy seem out of place, if not completely inappropriate, the issue of elections and democracy is still squarely on both the Palestinian and international agendas.

In fact, recent actions by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in asserting its authority and using its right to ratify the Palestinian Authority (PA) Cabinet as an opportunity to demand public accountability from President Arafat commanded attention around the world. The PLC's call for action on long overdue elections to a new PLC was also heeded as a sign that the Palestinian legislative body is demonstrating a new maturity and resolve. Elections, as many PLC members have said, can serve as a catalyst for broader reform within the PA and, if perceived as meaningful by the Palestinian public and by the international community, could herald the resuscitation of the process of Palestinian democratic development.

As Palestinians enter the period preceding proposed 2003 elections, it may be useful to reflect on what elections in 2003 should be about and to draw some lessons from the successes and failures of the elections of 1996. While calling the 1996 polls "a remarkable achievement", a joint National Democratic Institute (NDI) / Carter Center report also lamented that the "election did not serve as a catalytic moment for democratic political organizing as transitional elections often do." Noting that electoral competition was not driven by ideology but rather by the reputations and promises of rival families and clans, 1996 election observers documented instances where the Palestinian Authority limited open debate and controlled media coverage of the campaign. The NDI/Carter Center report also highlighted the fact that the "electoral framework unfolded in a seemingly haphazard fashion with many important decisions being made and revised up to election day."

Notwithstanding some criticism of the 1996 election, the new PLC was greeted with hope by Palestinians and the international community alike. The first months of the PLC showed promise. Taking their obligations seriously and acting as duly elected representatives of the people, the PLC passed a comprehensive Basic Law and brought public attention to allegations of corruption within the PA. Soon, though, both the PA, unhappy with the PLC's independent tendencies, and the international community, preferring the single-minded pursuit of the peace process to the complications of developing Palestinian democracy, worked to make the PLC irrelevant; the PA by actively marginalizing the PLC in any political question of importance and the international community through benign neglect.

Fast forward to September 2002 and there is a danger of history repeating itself. President Arafat, in setting the date for an election as a tactic for avoiding a vote of confidence, is casting doubt on the meaning of Palestinian elections - are elections a political tactic to serve the needs of the Palestinian Authority or a meaningful event serving to develop democracy? Will the PLC arising from new elections be allowed to fulfill its obligations without interference from the PA? In setting a date only four months hence (as of this writing, January 20, 2003), will enough time be available for a significant public debate on electoral systems, to negotiate solutions to difficult questions like voting in East Jerusalem, and, most importantly, to secure freedom of movement to allow the maximum chance for parties, factions and coalitions to develop platforms and communicate effectively with voters?

In a recent pre-election assessment report written by representatives of three Washington-based NGOs, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), and by independent elections experts from Norway, Canada and Argentina after extensive consultations with Palestinian political and civic leaders and elections officials, concerns were raised about the political and technical viability of early 2003 elections. Most Palestinians interviewed by the assessment team were adamant in their conviction that elections can and should be held as a part of a broader reform plan but they were equally adamant that the election system and election administration be debated publicly and, if necessary, changed to reflect the public will. For example, there was near unanimity on the need for the formation of an independent election commission and for a debate on the merits and disadvantages of a proportional representation system versus the majoritarian system now in place.

In the course of the pre-election assessment, broader political questions also emerged. For example, Palestinians were clear in their demands that the Arab residents of East Jerusalem must be allowed to participate in PA elections while Israelis were equally convinced that there would be no voting in east Jerusalem as part of 2003 polls. Most Palestinian interlocutors were also convinced that meaningful elections could not be held while many cities are under curfew and travel between towns and cities is impossible. An election without adequate public input, without independent administrative authorities and under strict Israeli military control, in the opinion of many Palestinians, would likely favor political incumbents, and may favor a vote that amounts to a referendum-like reaffirmation of the current leadership rather than a genuine opportunity to cast a vote for political renewal.

Given the considerable political and technical obstacles to be overcome prior to the conduct of a meaningful election, the pre-election assessment team suggested a series of initiatives or "benchmarks" that should be undertaken before a final election date is set. Once these benchmark issues have been resolved, or at least serious efforts have been initiated, then a realistic election date can be proposed. These benchmark issues are:

1) Establishment of an independent election commission and administrative authorities and the promulgation, after sufficient public debate and consultation, of a renewed election law. The make-up of an independent election commission should be ratified by the PLC.

2) A negotiated solution to the question of voting in East Jerusalem, based, to the degree possible, on the arrangements of 1996.

3) Freedom of movement - limited at first, if necessary, to key election officials and then expanded to include political candidates and party and NGO leaders, leading finally to virtually full freedom of movement within the West Bank and Gaza some months before election day.

4) A decision on candidate qualifications and requirements. The assessment team heard many arguments both for and against the establishment of candidacy prohibitions, and, after studying international precedent, recommended that a code of political ethics be adopted that, if enforced effectively, would exclude individuals engaged in or advocating violence.

Some of these benchmark issues can be addressed by Palestinians alone, and others will require internationally sponsored negotiation, but, in the interests of a meaningful election, sincere efforts to address these issues must be made soon.

A legitimate argument can be made that setting pre-election benchmarks could lead to the endless postponement of polls, which would be counter productive to the interests of Palestinian democracy. While supporting the timely holding of Palestinian elections, perhaps later in 2003, the delegation warned that the time required to solve political questions, including voting in East Jerusalem and freedom of movement, may take up so much valuable election preparation time that rushed technical arrangements, lack of public input into electoral systems and little or no voter education may lead to elections which benefit nothing but the status quo. Meaningful elections in the West Bank and Gaza should offer clear and understandable choices, a genuine hope of change and a chance to form a PLC that can resist marginalization by the PA. Palestinians should question undue haste and demand that elections be held under conditions that will allow the voice of the people to be heard.

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